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T HE IRAQI CONFLICT: AN
ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBLE WAR
CRIMES AND THE CALL FOR
ADOPTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL CODE AND PERMANENT
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, unleashing a series of
events that led to a full-scale war in the Persian Gulf.' The sum of events,
including the invasion of Kuwait, as well as the "re-invasion" by Coalition
forces, raised issues contemplated under international criminal law.2
The Iraqi conflict is the first international crisis since World War II
that did not reflect cold war tensions between the United States and the
Soviet Union.3 While the United States arguably led the contingent
condemning Iraq, the crisis was not resolved as a function of East-West
relations. 4 Rather, the crisis and its after-effects were resolved through a
multinational effort, employing universal norms embodied in international
charters and agreements as the bases for their actions.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze alleged war crimes committed
during the Iraqi conflict using generally accepted doctrines of international
law. This Note will then consider the possible advantages to be derived
from the creation of a permanent international criminal tribunal and the
1. See generally Thomas L. Friedman & Patrick E. Tyler, From the First, U.S.
Resolve to Fight, N.Y. TMEs, Mar. 3, 1991, at Al.
2. Linda P. Campbell, Hussein Could Be Tnied for War Crimes, Experts Say, CHI.
TRiB., Jan. 22, 1991, at 7.
3. Joint Soviet-American Statemwnt for Peace and Security, U.N. GAOR 45th Sess.,
Oct. 3, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TASS File. The confrontational nature
of relations between East and West is giving way to a cooperative relationship and
partnership. Id. "The most telling condemnation came from Moscow, Iraq's long-time
ally. An outraged Mikhail Gorbachev warned that an Iraqi failure to heed United Nations
resolution would 'inevitably compel the Security Council to adopt appropriate additional
measures.'" The World v. Saddam Hussein, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 25, 1990, at A22.
4. "Each fresh breach of law solidifies the global consensus against [Saddam
Hussein)." The World v. Saddam Hussein, supra note 3, at A22.
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adoption of an international criminal code. The central thesis of this Note
is that the inability of states and their national legal systems to unilaterally
control and suppress international criminality has created, or at least
highlighted, the need for an international criminal code and a permanent
international criminal tribunal. Through the creation of a permanent
international criminal court, and the adoption of an international criminal
code, a more reliable mechanism would be formed through which
international transgressions could be adjudicated.
The Iraqi conflict provides a rich context for analysis of current and
proposed international criminal law doctrines. The Iraqi government and
military have been accused of committing war crimes by those nations and
international bodies that opposed the invasion of Kuwait.5 Iraq has
alternately faced official condemnation, economic sanctions, a military
initiative to retake Kuwait, and continued ostracism from the world
community.6 Individually, Iraqi officials have been threatened with
prosecution, before a "Nuremberg-style" tribunal, to answer accusations
of war crimes.7 At present, an adjudicative response has failed to
materialize. If one does, however, questions regarding the efficacy of
available adjudicative measures will most certainly arise.8
Doctrinal uncertainties and inconsistent applications of international
law render attempts to adjudicate war crimes vulnerable to attack as
selective enforcement of vague and overly-broad doctrines.' Nevertheless,
if war crimes have been committed, and the opportunity to adjudicate
arises, then a body of law must be adopted, a forum selected, and an
adjudication commenced. If this comes to pass, then the adjudicative
mechanism should contemplate and address two concerns. Of immediate
concern is the prosecution of alleged war crimes in the instant case. A
5. Campbell, supra note 2, at 7.
6. See generally S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg., at 19, U.N.
Doe. SIJNF/46 (1990); S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg., at 19, U.N.
Doe. S/INF/46 (1990); S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2934th mtg., at 20, U.N.
S/INF/46 (1990); S.C. Res. 664, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2937th mtg., at 20-21, U.N.
Doe. S/INF/46 (1990); S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th mtg., at 21, U.N.
Doe. S/INF/46 (1990); S.C. Res. 667, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2940th mtg., at 22-23,
U.N. Doe. S/INF/46 (1990); S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2943d mtg., at 24,
U.N. Doe. S/INF/46 (1990).
7. See generally Patrick E. Tyler, Desert Trial for the Laws of War, FIN. TIMES
(London), Sept. 8, 1990, at 1.
8. Adam Roberts, Crisis in the Gulf, Inducing Iraq to Comply with the Rules of War,
THE INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 6, 1990, at 11 [hereinafter Roberts, Inducing Iraq].
9. Tyler, supra note 7, at 1.
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concern for the future is the development of a permanent international
criminal justice tribunal with binding authority, guided by a single,
inclusive body of law.
This Note will address these concerns by examining the following
issues: acts committed by the Iraqi's that are alleged war crimes and the
bodies of law that are likely to be applied to those acts; the forum and
jurisdictional options available for adjudication; and the possible
establishment of a permanent international criminal tribunal and adoption
of an international criminal code.
II. THE INVASION
During the latter part of July 1990, Iraqi troops, tanks, and air
support began to assemble along the Kuwaiti border.10 Ostensibly, this
show of force was a bargaining tactic in the ongoing feud for control of
the Rumaila oil fields.11 Conventional wisdom indicated that Iraq's claim
to the oil fields could have been settled with a payment by the Kuwaitis as
had previously been done.
1 2
Nevertheless, at 2:00 A.M. on August 2, 1990, troops from Iraq's
elite Republican Guard pushed across the Kuwaiti border and headed south
to Kuwait City.' 3 Within days, Kuwait City and other strategic targets
were overrun and firmly in the hands of the Iraqis. 4 Shortly thereafter,
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein declared Kuwait the nineteenth province
of Iraq.'"
The invasion was immediately condemned by the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, and Germany. 6 International bodies, including
10. The Iraqi Invasion, Step by Step, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 3, 1990, at A9.
11. Peter Grier, Iraqi Looting Threatens to Strip Kuwait of Identity, CHRISTIAN SC.
MONITOR, Oct. 19, 1990, at 1.
12. The Iraqi Invasion, Step by Step, supra note 10, at A9.
13. Friedman & Tyler, supra note 1, at Al.
14. Id.
15. Leonard Doyle, Crisis in the Gulf: U.S. Maneuvers to Set Security Council
Agenda, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 18, 1990, at 10; Iraq claims that Kuwait is
its nineteenth province and therefore did not accept that it was an occupying power bound
by the Geneva Conventions, to which it is a signatory. Id. "Iraq's claim to Kuwait, even
if it had historical weight, has no legal validity." Tyler, supra note 7, at 1.
16. Thomas L. Friedman, The Iraqi Invasion: U.S. is Seeking to Forestall Any Arab
Deal for Kuwait, N.Y. TIMDS, Aug. 5, 1990, at A12.
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the United Nations,1 7 the European Community, 8 and the Arab League, 9
also protested the invasion, characterizing it as an inexcusable use of
aggressive force. The protest specifically condemned the use of
aggressive force;2" the abuse of civilians and property within Kuwait; 2' the
abuse of diplomatic personnel;22 and the detention of foreigners in Kuwait
and Iraq.'
l[. RESPONSES TO THE IRAQI INVASION
Responses to the invasion by nations and international bodies that
opposed it fell into the following categories: condemnation, economic and
military, and legal response.
A. Condemnation
From the outset, Western nations condemned the Iraqi invasion as a
violation of international law.' A majority of Arab nations quickly
17. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg., at 19, U.N. Doe S/INF/46
(1990); Adam Roberts, Saddam Leaps the Hurdles of Law, THE INDEPENDENT (London),
Aug. 23, 1990, at 25 [hereinafter Roberts, Saddam Leaps]. See also infra note 49 and
accompanying text.
18. Friedman, supra note 16, at A12. The twelve-member EEC froze Iraqi assets,
halted all oil imports from Baghdad, and banned all arms sales. Id. Community leaders
told Iraq "once again that it must withdraw completely from Kuwait." Clyde Haberman,
West Europeans Formally Initiate Closer Federation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1990, at Al.
19. Resolution Issued by Emergency Arab Sumit in Cairo, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Aug. 13, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File.
20. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg., at 19, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46
(1990).
21. Kuwait Pays the Price, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 4, 1990, at 26.
"Refugees from that nation, Kuwaiti and foreign alike, have brought with them appalling
accounts of rape, torture, public execution, widespread and systematic looting and the
destruction of homes from which minor acts of defiance to the occupying power had
supposedly stemmed." Id.
22. S.C. Res. 664, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2937th mtg., at 20-21, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/46 (1990); Alan Riding, Americans and British Worst Off Under Iraqis, Freed
French Say, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 31, 1990, at Al; see also Roberts, Saddam Leaps, supra
note 17, at 25. "Treatment of foreign nationals [was] the first major issue on which Iraq
[ignored] well-established laws of war." Id.
23. S.C. Res. 667, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2940th mtg., at 22-23, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/46 (1990).
24. Roberts, Saddam Leaps, supra note 17, at 25.
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followed suit." The Arab League, Islamic Conference Organization, and
the Gulf Co-operation Council released resolutions condemning the
invasion and rejecting Iraq's claim to Kuwaiti territory.26 The General
Assembly of the United Nations passed resolutions condemning the
attack,"2 and soon thereafter, the United Nations Security Council passed
resolutions demanding Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, rejecting and
refusing to recognize the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait.28
The United Nations Security Council passed twelve resolutions
concerning the Iraqi invasion and aftermath." The culmination was
Resolution 678, which authorized member states to use all necessary
means, after January 15, 1991, to uphold and implement all relevant
Security Council Resolutions, and to restore international peace and
security in the region.30
B. Economic and Military Response
The failure of world opinion to dislodge Iraqi forces from Kuwait led
individual nations and international coalitions to consider economic and
military sanctions.3 Acting through the United Nations, countries opposed
25. Twelve Arab states voted to send Arab Forces to the Gulf to protect Saudi Arabia
and its neighbors against foreign invasion. Crisis in the Gulf," Twelve Vote to Send Gulf
Force, FIN. TnMES (London), Aug. 11, 1990, at 3. The emergency Arab summit that
convened on August 10, 1990, decided to confirm the Arab League Council Resolution
195 issued August 3, 1990, to confirm the Islamic Conference Organization statement
issued on August 4, 1990, to denounce the Iraqi aggression, to call on Iraq to withdraw,
and to confirm Kuwait's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. Resolution
Issued by Emergency Arab Summit in Cairo, supra note 19; G. C. C. Information Ministers
Denounce Iraq, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 17, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, BBCSWB File.
26. Resolution Issued by Emergency Arab Summit in Cairo, supra note 19, at 1;
G. C. C. Information Ministers Denounce Iraq, supra note 25.
27. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg., at 19, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46
(1990)
28. Id.; S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2934th mtg., at 20, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/46 (1990)
29. Paul Lewis, Mideast Tensions, U.N. Gives Iraq Until January 15 to Retreat or
Face Force; Hussein Says He Will Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1990, at Al. "The
Security Council has adopted 12 resolutions against Iraq since the Persian Gulf crisis
began." Id.
30. See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., at 29, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/46 (1990).
31. E.g., S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg., at 19, U.N. Doc.
SINF/46 (1990); S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th mtg., at 21, U.N. Doc.
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to the invasion sought and won approval for economic sanctions against
Iraq." A series of increasingly restrictive resolutions resulted in a land,
sea, and air embargo. The purpose was to prevent all but bare essentials
from entering Iraq.3 The ability of Iraq to export oil, by far its largest
source of income, was also restricted as Turkey and Saudi Arabia shut
down Iraqi oil pipelines running through their territory. 4
Military sanctions commenced with a United States-led blockade of
the Persian Gulf." Soon thereafter, an international force consisting
primarily of American troops, armor, and air support, were deployed
along the Saudi Arabian border to guard against an Iraqi invasion of that
Arab nation. 6 This portion of the military operation bore the code name
"Desert Shield," to connote its defensive posture.
3 7
On January 15, 1991, the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait
passed, with Iraqi forces numbering approximately 545,000 still
entrenched in Kuwait and southern Iraq.38 Coalition Forces located in the
region included troops from twenty-eight nations, numbering
S/INF/46 (1990); S.C. Res. 667, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2940th mtg., at 22-23, U.N.
Doc. S/INF/46 (1990); S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., at 20, U.N.
Doc. S/INF/46 (1990).
32. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., at 29, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46
(1990).
33. Christopher Greenwood, Now Force is Given the Teeth of Law, THE TIMES
(London), Aug. 27, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MAJPAP File. Security
Council Resolution 665 authorizes navel forces in the Gulf to enforce United Nations
sanctions against Iraq. Id. See also Jacqueline Frank, U.S. Presses Iraq on Diplomatic,
Economic, Military Fronts, Reuter Lib. Rep., Aug. 31, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, LBYRPT File.
34. "Iraqi oil no longer flows through pipelines in Saudi Arabia and Turkey."
Confrontation in the Gulf: Excerpts from Bush's Speech on Iraq Policy, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
29, 1990, at A14.
35. Frank, supra note 33.
36. Kim R. Holmes, How to Defeat Iraq, Heritage Found. Rep., Aug. 23, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, HFRPTS File. In the fastest military build-up in
history, the United States moved into position near Iraq: an entire Marine Expeditionary
Force of 50,000; parts of at least two tank-laden Army mechanized divisions; four aircraft
carriers; and Air Force fighters, bombers, and ground-attack aircraft from the venerable
B-52 bomber to the ultra-modern, radar-evading F-1 17A stealth fighter. Id.
37. The American deployment, which was given the code name, Desert Shield, was
the largest such deployment since the war in Vietnam. R.W. Apple, Jr., Confrontation
in the Gulf. U.S. Set to Blockade Baghdad's Shipping: Iraq Detains Foreigners, Upsets
Summit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1990, at Al.
38. Andrew Rosenthal, War in the Guf. The Overview, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 17, 1991,
at Al [hereinafter Rosenthal, The Overview].
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approximately 690,000;"9 425,000 of these troops were American
soldiers .4
On January 16, 1991, approximately nineteen hours after the
expiration of the deadline, the coalition led by the United States launched
an attack code named "Desert Storm," meant to drive Iraqi forces from
Kuwait.41 The attack initially targeted strategic sites in Iraq and Kuwait.42
The Coalition's initial strategy was to destroy the Iraqi command
communication ability, in hopes that this would inhibit their ability to
shoot down Coalition aircraft, or effectively launch their own aircraft.43
The air war continued through February 23, 1991, with Coalition forces
dropping thousands of tons of explosives on Iraqi targets.' The Coalition
ground attack commenced on February 24, 1991, when Saudi troops and
United States Marines attacked Iraqi forces in Kuwait.45
On February 27, 1991, four days after the ground assault had
commenced, President Bush ordered Coalition forces to suspend offensive
military force. Iraq was offered forty-eight hours to meet with Coalition
commanders to settle military terms for a cease-fire. 4 On May 3, 1991,
the Iraqi commanders accepted all terms proposed by the Coalition
commanders, as well as those embodied in relevant United Nations
Security Council Resolutions.47
C. Legal Response
At present, there has been little in the way of "legal response" to the
Iraqi invasion and commission of war crimes. National and multinational
responses have consisted primarily of threats to try Iraqi leaders before a
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Andrew Rosenthal, War in the Gulf." The White House; President Asserts He Is
Putting Off Land-War Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1991, at Al.
42. "In conjunction with the forces of our Coalition partners, the U.S. has moved
under the code name, Operation Desert Storm, to enforce the mandates of the United
Nations Security Council." Rosenthal, The Overview, supra note 38, at Al.
43. Id.
44. Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Halts Offensive Combat; Kuwait Freed, Iraq Is Crushed,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 1991, at Al.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. R.W. Apple, Jr., U.S. Says Iraqi Generals Agree to Demands on All Matters;
Early P.O.W. Release Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1991, at Al.
1993]
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Nuremberg-like tribunal.4 Choice of law questions have raised the
Nuremberg Charter, United Nations Charter, Geneva Conventions, Vienna
Protocols, and Genocide Convention as appropriate statutes.49 Forum
selection suggestions include the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), °
an ad hoc international tribunal,5 or municipal forums based on standard
international law theory.52
Formal war crimes charges have not been lodged with any
adjudicative body. This, however, is not for any lack of documentation.
In fact, since the conflict began, the United States military has assembled
a dossier of war crimes allegedly committed by Iraq.53 When Coalition
48. British Prime Minister Thatcher announced that the British intended to "prosecute
the requisite people for their totally uncivilised and brutal behavior." Marc Weller, When
Saddam Is Brought to Court . . . .THE TIMEs (London), Sept. 3, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, MAJPAP File. "Washington would prefer the establishment of an
international, Nuremberg-style tribunal by the United Nations." Id. See also Roberts,
Inducing Iraq, supra note 8, at 11. Prime Minister Thatcher stated: "If anything
happened to those hostages then, sooner or later, when any hostilities were over, we could
do what we did at Nuremberg and prosecute the requisite people of their totally uncivilised
and brutal behavior." Id.
49. Roberts, Saddam Leaps, supra note 17, at 25. "Iraq, in occupying and
purportedly annexing Kuwait, has violated the most fundamental norms of international
relations, particularly the United Nations Charter and the 1949 Geneva Conventions." Id.
"Iraq. . . is a party to ...the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical
warfare, the 1948 Genocide Conventions, and the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. Iraq
has freely consented to be bound by these treaties and has not denounced any of them."
Id. See also Weller, supra note 48. The use of civilians as human shields would be
classified as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. Id.
50. MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 245
(1987). The ICJ is one of the six principal organs of the UN, and its statute is annexed
to the United Nations Charter, so that all members of the UN are automatically parties to
the statute. Id.
51. Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX.
L. REv. 785, 801 (1988). The nations that opposed Iraq could form an ad hoc
tribunal/military court to try those Iraqis accused of war crimes, similar to the Nuremberg
Tribunal. Id. Major German war criminals were tried at Nuremberg by the International
Military Tribunal ("IMT"), which was created and administered jointly by the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. Id.
52. Eric S. Kobrick, Note, The Ex Post Facto Prohibition and the Exercise of
Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 1491, 1519 (1987).
International law recognizes five types of criminal jurisdiction: territorial, nationality of
offender, protective, passive personalty, and universality. Id.
53. Deborah Zabarenko, U.S. Building War Crimes File on Iraq, Reuters News Rep.,
Aug. 31, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File (noting that the United
States has a war crimes file on Iraq, which focuses on the taking of hostages and the use
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forces engaged the Iraqis, the Pentagon activated ninety lawyer-reservists
to aid in addressing the legal issues evoked by the crisis.' After the
cease-fire, the United Nations also sent a contingent of officials to the
Persian Gulf to investigate allegations of war crimes."
IV. ACTS CoMITED BY IRAQ WHICH MAY BE
SUBJECT TO WAR CRIMES PROCEEDINGS
In the event that attempts to adjudicate war crimes materialize, the
subject matter addressed would include the following acts allegedly
committed by Iraq: initiation of aggressive war; 6 abuse of Kuwaiti
citizens, 7 foreigners,5" diplomatic personnel,59 and prisoners of war;' and
property damage and confiscation.61
A. Aggressive War or Aggressive Use of Force
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has been roundly criticized as an
initiation of aggressive war.62 Iraq eschewed the criticism and instead
of foreign captives as human shields).
54. Fred Strasser, Law Corps Added in War Plans, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 28, 1991, at
28.
55. See generally Rosenthal, The Overview, supra note 38, at Al.
56. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg., at 19, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46
(1990).
57. Amnesty International USA, News Release (Oct. 2, 1990) (on file with the New
York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law).
58. S.C. Res. 664, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2937th mtg., at 20-21, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/46 (1990).
59. S.C. Res. 667, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2940th mtg., at 22-23, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/46 (1990).
60. Campbell, supra note 2, at 7.
61. Peter Grier, Iraqi Looting Threatens to Strip Kuwait of Identity, CHRISTIAN Scd.
MoI'rroR, Oct. 19, 1990, at 1. Property damage and stolen articles included "zoo
animals, street lamps, Mercedes Benzes, infant incubators, and a priceless 7,000 piece
Islamic art collection." Id. "In what exiled Kuwaitis charge is one of the great looting
sprees of modern times, all these items and many more have allegedly been stolen by Iraqi
forces in Kuwait and shipped back to Baghdad." Id. "So much has been taken, say
White House officials, that they worry the economic entity of Kuwait was being wiped off
the map .... Iraqi dismantlement of Kuwait has two aims: enrichment of Baghdad, and
destruction of the Kuwaiti identity." Id.
62. The World v. Saddam Hussein, supra note 3, at A22.
1993]
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asserted a claim of right to the entirety of Kuwait, including the Rumaila
oil fields, which straddle the border between the two countries.63 Iraq
defended the annexation "on the administrative unity of the current
landmass of Iraq and Kuwait under the Ottoman empire."" They argued
that the 1913 division of Iraq from Kuwait was arbitrarily imposed upon
them by the British and was therefore invalid.65 Alternatively, Iraqi
leadership justified the invasion as an appropriate military response to
"economic warfare" waged by the Kuwaitis.' Economic warfare is a
reference to the Kuwaitis' routine practice of exceeding the oil export
quota imposed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
("OPEC").
67
Regardless of the historic or economic validity of these arguments,
neither invokes a motive that can be reconciled with international
prohibitions against the aggressive use of force. Thus, the attempted
annexation of Kuwait appears to be a clear-cut example of aggressive war,
condemned under all major international charters and conventions. 8
Aggressive war is universally regarded as a criminal act. 69 Aggressive
war may be defined as "destructive coercion which reasonably creates in
the target state-as reasonableness can be tested by third
parties-expectations that it must react with violence to conserve its own
values. "70 Using the reasonableness standard embraced by this definition,
63. Excerpts from Iraq's Statement to U.N. Security Council, Reuter Lib. Rep., Aug.
9, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File.
64. Bruce Fein, Indict Hussein for Aggressive War?, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1990,
at GI.
65. Iraqi Foreign Minister's Address Presented at U.N. General Assembly Session,
BBC Middle East Executive Rep., Oct. 8, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
MDEAST File.
66. Joseph B. Treaster, The Iraqi Invasion: Jordan Talks of Balance, But Some See
Iraqi 7ilt, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 8, 1990, at All. "[N]ot only were Kuwait and Iraq feuding
about Iraqi claims that Kuwait had been pilfering millions of dollars worth of oil from
border oilfields, but Iraq has claimed ownership of Kuwait property since its emergence
as a state in 1961." Id.
67. Id.
68. Campbell, supra note 2, at 7.
69. See U.N. CHARTER preamble art. 2, 4; see also Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, a, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter
NUREMBERG CHARTER].
70. MYREs S. McDouGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MRINMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 170-71 (1961).
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an attack through force of arms is equivalent to "destructive coercion."
The legitimacy of military force depends upon the factors that
motivate the use. 71 Force used to defend is always legitimate, as nations
have an inherent right to self-defense.7 2  By contrast, aggressive or
unprovoked use of force is almost never considered legitimate. 7 Between
these two extremes are uses of force that are difficult to categorize as
explicitly defensive or aggressive.
An example of force that falls into the grey area between explicitly
defensive or aggressive use of force is the preemptive strike.74 A
preemptive strike occurs when a nation, motivated by fear of an imminent
attack, strikes out at a potential enemy before the potential enemy can
attack them. When preemptive strikes occur, the questions surrounding
the use of force focus primarily on the nature and apparent imminence of
the threat. Proponents of preemptive strikes argue that the mere
anticipatory nature of the use does not automatically qualify it as
aggressive.75 The counter argument holds that preemptive strikes are only
71. Id.
72. See HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACES, b. H, pt. I at 172 (Carnegie
Endowment trans. 1925) (1646). The traditional naturalist doctrine of self-defense as an
inherent right is expressed by Hugo Grotius. According to Grotius, self-defence has its
origin "in the fact that nature commits to each his own protection." Id. See also J.G.
STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 536 (1989). The inherent right to self-
defense is also reflected in article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Id. "If a state
legitimately defends itself against attack by another . . . . it is not guilty of waging
aggressive war, or of using aggressive force." Id.
73. IAN BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (3d ed. 1983).
Every state has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force. Id.
74. One example of a preemptive strike is the 1981 Israeli attack on an Iraqi nuclear
plant; Israel invoked article 51 of the United Nations charter to justify the attack on the
plant. Israel claimed that the plant was going to be used to make atom bombs for use
against Israel, and that Israel was therefore entitled to destroy the reactor as an act of
anticipatory self-defense. The United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned
the action. Council Condemns Israel's Air Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 18 UN
MONTHLY CHRON. 5, 5-9, 61-74 (1981).
75. AKEHURST, supra note 50, at 262. Supporters of a right to anticipatory self-
defense claim that article 51 does not limit the circumstances in which self-defense may
be exercised; they deny that the word "if," as used in article 51, means "if and only if."
They suggest that it would be inconsistent for a provision simultaneously to restrict a right
and recognize it as inherent. Id. Stuart S. Malawer, Anticipatory Self-Defence Under
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 197 (1977).
"To restrict the meaning of aggression solely to 'armed attack' is dangerous as it is
simplistic. In light of the decentralized nature of the international community to impose
effective sanctions on states violating provisions of the charter, a state should have a broad
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marginally different from aggressive uses of force, and therefore, are
almost never legitimate.76
Those who accept the validity of anticipatory strikes argue that the
context of the attack is dispositive with regard to legitimacy. 77 That is, the
nature of the threat-military or economic, imminent or remote-and the
nature of the response-weapons used, length and severity of the response
-determines the legitimacy of the strike. 7' Regardless, blatantly
aggressive uses of force are criminal by definition under most
multinational agreements.
Relevant multinational agreements that contemplate aggressive use of
force are rooted in laws that were developed to regulate personal and
economic interactions between members of different sovereign states.80
Rules of behavior "evolved after a long historical process culminating in
their recognition by the international community."l The rules pertain to
"usage," the harmonization of which became customary international
law.82
right to the use of its military force." Id.
76. AKEHURST, supra note 50, at 263. The trouble with anticipatory self-defense is
that a state can seldom be absolutely certain about the other side's intentions. Id. In
moments of crisis there is seldom time to check information suggesting that an attack is
imminent. Id.
77. Malawer, supra note 75, at 191.
78. One arguably legitimate example of anticipatory self-defense was the United
States quarantine of Cuba in 1962. AKEHURST, supra note 50, at 262, 263, 268. The
United States blockaded Cuba in order to interdict the supply of certain weapons and
equipment to prevent the establishment of missile bases in Cuba. Id. Acting with
authorization from the Organization of American States ("OAS"), the United States
searched merchant ships approaching Cuba and forced them to turn back if they were
transporting arms. Id. Though criticized as use of aggressive force, the blockade was
never condemned by the United Nations Security Council. Id. Also, the United States
relied on article 53 by forming the blockade under the auspices of the OAS. As a result,
they avoided the creation of a potentially harmful precedent had they relied on article 51
to justify the blockade. Id.
79. See generally Conventions signed at The Hague, July 29, 1899 and Oct. 18,
1907; U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
80. See generally STARKE, supra note 72, at 9-15.
81. Id. at 15. International law is an indispensable body of rules regulating for the
most part, the relations between states, without which it would be virtually impossible for
them to have steady and frequent intercourse. It is in fact an expression of the necessity
of their mutual relationships. In the absence of some system of international law, the
international society of states could not enjoy the benefits of trade, commerce, exchange
of ideas, and normal routine communication. Id.
82. Id. at 16. Usage is an international habit of action that has not yet received full
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The logical extension of customary international law is treaty-based
law. 3 Treaty-based law is manifested in bilateral and multilateral
agreements between nations." The first treaty of the modern era to
contemplate the illegality of aggressive force was embodied in the 1899
Hague Conventions for the Pacifistic Settlement of International
Disputes. 5 Their primary purpose was to create the machinery for setting
up international arbitration tribunals to settle disputes between sovereign
states.8 6 The procedural aspects of the arbitration process were later
amplified by the Hague Peace Conference of 1907.7
The next major agreement addressing aggressive use of force was the
Treaty of Versailles, signed at the conclusion of World War I. The Treaty
of Versailles included a clause that expressly condemned "aggressive
war." 8 A ban on "aggressive war" was later enumerated in the Covenant
of the League of Nations, 9 and again in the Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928.
The Kellog-Briand Pact specifically renounced aggressive use of force as
an instrument of foreign policy. 9°
The emergence of the Nuremberg Charter and the ratification of the
legal attention. Usages may be conflicting, custom must be unified and self-consistent.
Id.
83. STARKE, supra note 72, at 36, 37. Customary rules crystalize from usages or
practices that have evolved in approximately three sets of circumstances: diplomatic
relations between states; practice of international organizations; and, state laws, decisions
of state courts, and state military or administrative practices. Id.
84. Id. at 42. Treaty contracts, for example, a treaty between two or among only
a few states, dealing with a special matter concerning these states exclusively; or, law-
making treaties that lay down rules of universal or general application. Id.
85. AKEHURST, supra note 50, at 244. The court decided twenty cases between 1900
and 1932; since then it has been overshadowed by the Permanent Court on International
Justice, with the International Court of Justice also hearing a few cases. Id.
86. Id. at 245.
87. GEORGE G. WILSON, HAGUE ARBITRATION CASES 472 (1915).
88. See generally Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, 225 C.T.S. 188.
89. The League of Nations Covenant Charter did not prohibit aggressive war
altogether, as article 12(1) states: "The members of the League agree that, if there should
arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter
either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in
no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial
decision, or the report by the Council." LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 12.
90. Kellog-Briand Peace Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, art. I, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
"The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples
that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and
renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one and other." Id.
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Charter of the United Nations were the next major expansions of the war
crimes doctrine in international law. 9' Both documents establish the
criminality of aggressive use of force in specific sections,' and are
considered the preeminent international agreements in this area.
Consequently, this Note will analyze the invasion of Kuwait in light of the
United Nations and the Nuremberg Charters.
1. The Charter of the United Nations
The threshold determination under the Charter of the United Nations
is whether the Charter may be applied to Iraq. The first basis for
application lies in the fact that Iraq was one of the original fifty-one
nations to sign and ratify the Charter of the United Nations.93 The second
basis may be derived from the fact that, since ratification, Iraq has
maintained its membership status in the United Nations General
Assembly.' Membership itself implicitly constitutes agreement to be
bound by the rules and regulations enumerated in the Charter.9" An
additional basis for application may be derived from that portion of the
Charter addressing collective self-defense. Since Kuwait is a member of
the United Nations and the Charter mandates collective self-defense in the
event that a member nation is attacked, the Charter would apply even if
Iraq renounced its membership, or was expelled from the United
Nations.96
With the applicability of the Charter established, analysis of the Iraqi
invasion begins with its preamble which states in part:
We the people of the United Nations determined to save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which has twice
in our lifetime brought untold sorrow to mankind, . . . to
reaffirm faith in . . . the equal rights . . . of nations large and
small . . . and to establish conditions under which justice and
91. NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 69, art. 6, a; U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 2.
92. NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 69, art. 6, a; U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 2.
93. EVERYMAN'S UNITED NATIONS 10 (1966).
94. Roberts, Saddam Leaps, supra note 17, at 46.
95. "All members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting
from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in
accordance with the present charter." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 3.
96. U.N. CHARTER art. 51; Bruce Fein, Indict Husseinfor Aggressive War?, WASH.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1990, at G1. In 1963, Kuwait was admitted to the UN and recognized
by Iraq as a distinct national sovereignty. Id.
[Vol. 14
IRAQI CONFLICT
respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources
of international law can be maintained. And for those ends...
unite our strength to maintain international peace and security
and ensure that armed force shall not be used.
97
The preamble advances the "scourge of war" as the genesis for the
creation of the United Nations.9" The main concern of the founders was
"to maintain international peace and security," 99 and the mandate of the
United Nations is "to unite our strength to maintain international peace and
security. "'00
Article 1 defines the purposes of the United Nations as being: "To
maintain international peace and security, and to that end: take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,
and for the suppression of acts of aggression .... "'0' Article 2, section
4 states that member nations shall pursue the purposes outlined in article
1 by refraining from "[tihe threat or use of force ... against the territory
or international integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. ""
Both excerpts reflect maintenance of rights and freedoms of sovereign
states as the overarching purpose of the United Nations."°3
Article 42 enables the United Nations Security Council'14 to address
"threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. "1' In
this capacity, the Council has the authority to investigate breaches of
international peace, make findings as to the validity of a complaint, and
recommend a response."0 6 Possible responses include the authority to




101. Id. art. 1.
102. Id. art. 2 4.
103. Id.
104. EVERYMAN'S UNITED NATIONS 12 (1966). The Security Council is made up
of five permanent members (currently the People's Republic of China ("China"), France,
the United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States) and ten non-permanent members
elected to two-year terms by the General Assembly. Id. The Security Council functions
as the UN's principal organ for the maintenance of international peace and security. Id.
The council may investigate disputes and alleged acts of aggression, and may recommend
enforcement measures to restore international peace and security. Id.
105. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
106. Id.
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enforce sanctions,10 7 impose blockades,O and employ military force to
restore peace and security."19
The invasion seems a blatant example of the kind of aggressive
behavior proscribed in article 2, section 4."0 In fact, massing troops at
the Kuwaiti border during the dispute over the Rumaila oil fields probably
violated article 2, section 4, which prohibits even the "threat of force
against the territory or international integrity of a sovereign nation.""'
Arguably, then, the actual invasion was an additional breach of article 2,
section 4.
Iraq offered multiple scenarios to justify their invasion of Kuwait.112
They advanced claims to the Rumaila oil fields and then to Kuwait in its
entirety. The Iraqis also justified the invasion as a valid response to
economic warfare initiated by Kuwait." 3 The territorial claim was
anchored in earlier disagreements over what the Iraqis considered an
arbitrary and unfair partition of Iraq and Kuwait by the British." 4
However, regardless of the merits of the claims put forth, none
advance a viable justification for the aggressive use of force under the
United Nations Charter. The charter's single exception to prohibitions
against the use of aggressive force is contained in article 51, " 5 which
states in part: "[N]othing in the present charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a member of the United Nations."" 6 Because Iraq clearly initiated
107. Id. art. 41.
108. Id. art. 42.
109. Id. art. 44.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Fein, supra note 64; see also S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d
mtg. at 19, U.N. Doe. S/INF/46 (1990). But see Iraqi Foreign Minister's Address
Presented at U.N. General Assembly Session, BBC Middle East Executive Rep., Oct. 8,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MDEAST File. The Kuwait issue has a history
that goes back to the modem colonialist's age, when the United Kingdom undertook to
sever Kuwait from Iraq in 1913. Id. All monarchist and republican regimes that ruled
Iraq over 70 years have rejected this colonialist measure. Id. The issue was also a source
of dispute at the Arab League and at the UN in the 1960s. Id.
113. Treaster, supra note 66.
114. Iraqi Foreign Minister's Address Presented at U.N. General Assembly Session,
BBC Middle East Executive Rep., Oct. 8, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
MDEAST File.
115. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
116. Id. Article 51 was also considered as a statutory anchor to justify a military
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the attack on Kuwait, it could not advance a credible argument that the
military build-up and subsequent invasion were acts of self-defense.' 1 7 It
is therefore unlikely that Iraq could avail itself of the article 51 exception.
In addition, Iraq could not with a straight face justify the invasion
under a theory of anticipatory self-defense. This argument is only credible
when there is an imminent threat to the territorial integrity or political
independence of a state. At the time of the invasion, Kuwait clearly posed
no such threat to Iraq."'
Finally, the purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international
peace and security "and to bring about by peaceful means the adjustment
or settlement of international disputes." 119 Therefore, regardless of the
validity of Iraqi claims to the Rumaila oil fields and Kuwait, their "method
to effectuate their claims did not comport with the purpose and principles
enumerated in the United Nations Charter."2 The charter supports
nonviolent, arms-length negotiation between two nations-bilateral
arbitration, arbitration before a United Nations panel, etc. -but will not
support the method chosen by Iraq to effectuate their claims.
122
2. The Nuremberg Charter
The Nuremberg Charter enumerates principles developed during the
1945 International Conference on Military Tribunals in London,
England."3 Article 6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter prohibits the aggressive
action to oust Iraq from Kuwait. Neil A. Lewis, Mideast Tensions; Sorting Out Legal
War Concerning Real War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1990, at A18.
117. Friedman & Tyler, supra note 1.
118. AKEHURST, supra note 50, at 262.
119. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1.
120. AKEHURST, supra note 50, at 264.
It is unlawful to attack territory which is in the possession of another state,
even though the state using force may consider that it has a better title to the
territory in question than the state in possession. Article 2(3) of the Charter
requires member states to settle their disputes by peaceful means, and this





123. The tribunal was invested with power to punish persons who had committed
crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity as defined in the charter.
MYREs McDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE 1043 (1981). The Allies tried to punish those who perpetrated the worst
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use of force, by declaring the waging of war a "crime against peace.""2
Wars of aggression are defined as the "planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan for
the accomplishment of the foregoing."1
2 5
A cursory analysis of the invasion indicates that Iraq contravened
article 6(a). The "planning and preparation" for a war of aggression is
indicated by the assemblage of troops at the Kuwaiti border. 26 These
actions were clearly not defensive, as Kuwait did not pose a military threat
to Iraq. t27 Moreover, the actual invasion fulfills the "initiation of a war
of aggression" element of article 6(a)."'
Further analysis of article 6(a) requires examination of the Nuremberg
Tribunal's interpretation of the article. The Nuremberg Tribunal initially
considered article 6(a) to embody two separate offenses: participation in
a common plan or conspiracy to wage a war of aggression; and the
planning, participation and initiation of a war of aggression.29 Ultimately,
the tribunal's indictment contained just one charge under article 6(a), that
being the common plan to prepare, initiate, and wage aggressive war. 3 '
The tribunal reasoned that the language pertaining to conspiracy did not
amount to a separate charge, but was designed to establish the
responsibility of persons in the common plan.' 3'
crimes the world has ever seen and in that way establish clear principles of international
law that would promote peace and deter war in the future. Stephen Fogelson, Note, The
Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 833, 837 (1990).
124. NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 69, art. 6, a.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. "Iraq has massed 100,000 troops on Kuwait's border.. . [which] dwarfs the
Kuwaiti Army.. . [of] about 20,000 troops." The Iraqi Invasion, Step by Step, supra
note 10, at A9.
128. See NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 69, art. 6, a.
129. McDoUGAL & REISMAN, supra note 123, at 1048.
In the opinion of the Tribunal these words do not add a new and separate crime
to those already listed. The words are designed to establish the responsibility
of persons participating in a common plan. The Tribunal will therefore
disregard the charges in Count One that the defendants conspired to commit
war crimes and crimes against humanity, and will consider only the common
plan to prepare, initiate and wage aggressive war.
Id.
130. Id.
131. See NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 69, art. 6, a. "Leaders, organizers,
instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan
[Vol. 14
IRAQI CONFLICT
Applied to the present situation, a tribunal would charge Iraqi
leadership with membership in a common plan to prepare, initiate and
wage an unlawful war.132 Article 6(a) would place responsibility for the
acts of the invaders on Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, as well as those
members of the Iraqi leadership-leaders, organizers and
accomplices-who are judged to have participated in the "common
plan." The acts prior to entering Kuwait-massing at the border,
developing a supply line, threatening Kuwait with invasion-would meet
the element of "participation in the plan to prepare, initiate and wage
aggressive war. " 134 The actual invasion would bolster the charge making
it likely that an adjudicative body would find Iraq in violation of article
6(a).
135
If formal charges are ever brought, under article 6(a) or (c), Iraq
would have difficulty advancing an exculpatory argument. A self-defense
or anticipatory self-defense argument would most likely fail, as Kuwait
posed no credible threat to Iraq.1 36 Also, using the Nuremberg trials as
relevant precedent, it would be virtually impossible for accused Iraqi
officials to advance the defense of wrongful prosecution based on a nullem
crimen sine lege theory. 137 When advanced at Nuremberg, it was refuted
by demonstrating that the German government must have known it was
abrogating existing treaties, as well as violating customary international
law when it prepared for and engaged in a war of aggression.
138
or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed
by any persons in execution of such plan." Id.
132. NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 69, art. 6 a. "The Nuremberg Principles
assert that a crime against world law is liable to punishment, that heads of state can be
held responsible .... These are punishable crimes: Crimes against peace, like initiating
a war of aggression in violation of international treaties." The World v. Saddam Hussein,
supra note 3.
133. Id.
134. See NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 69, art. 6.
135. Id.
136. The Iraqi Invasion, Step by Step, supra note 10, at A9.
137. Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165 (1937). "[N]o conduct
shall be criminal unless it is specifically described in ... a penal statute." Id. at 165.
138. Kobrick, supra note 52, at 1533.
[Elx post facto prohibition occupies a different status in the international field
than in the domestic field, for the basic reason that international law has no
legislature to pass statutes defining acts as criminal. International law is not
a product of statutes, but of treaties, conventions, judicial decision and
customs. It is the 'gradual expression, case by case, of the moral judgements
of the civilized world.'
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B. The Abuse of Persons and Property
Shortly after the invasion commenced, Iraq ousted the Kuwaiti emir,
secured territory, and asserted sovereignty over Kuwait. 139 Up to the point
where occupation was complete, the Iraqis were bound by the laws of war
with respect to treatment of persons and property.I4° These laws are
rooted in customary law and codified in various multinational agreements,
including the Geneva Conventions, the Nuremberg Charter, the Genocide
Conventions and Vienna Conventions. All but one of these agreements
address acts that occur during both war and peacetime. The single
exception is the Nuremberg Charter, which only contemplates acts that
occur during war. 141 These agreements all prohibit the abuse of civilians,
prisoners of war, wounded and sick combatants, foreigners, and
diplomatic personnel. 142  They also provide a minimum standard of
treatment to be administered by an invader, with respect to persons and
property encountered during armed conflict. 1
43
When one party to a dispute gains superiority over the other, thereby
ending the war, the laws of war give way to the laws of belligerent
occupation. 1" A war has concluded when the defeated state enters into a
peace treaty that cedes territory to the victor, or that recognizes the
victor's title to territory.145 In the absence of a peace treaty, a belligerent
can assert title only if it demonstrates intent to assert title'" and then
produces evidence that all resistance by the enemy state and its allies has
ceased.' 47 Similar to the laws of war, the laws of belligerent occupation
place upon the invader a duty to treat humanely those individuals who
remain within the local sovereignty.141
Id.
139. Friedman & Tyler, supra note 1.
140. See generally AKEHURST, supra note 50, at 148-50.
141. LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 240 (1989).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See generally Davis P. Goodman, Note, The Need for Fundamental Change in
the Law of Belligerent Occupation, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1573, 1573-75 (1985).
145. See AKEHURST, supra note 50, at 148.
146. Id.
147. Id. For example, the German annexation of Poland during World War fl was
invalid, because Poland's allies continued to oppose Germany. Id.
148. Goodman, supra note 144, at 1574.
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The laws of belligerent occupation require an occupant to refrain from
activity that would disrupt the existing structure of life in the occupied
territory.1 49  In an attempt to limit the destruction inherent in armed
conflict, the law prohibits abuse of civilians, foreigners, diplomats, and
private property. 50 Though some exceptions are recognized,", persons
and property are to be treated by the victor in the same manner they would
have been treated had their previous ruler not been deposed."'
For the most part, the belligerent occupant is considered an interim
military administrator, entitled to obedience from the inhabitants so far as
public order, safety of the occupying forces, and the administration of
territory are concerned.' Although adherence to the laws of belligerent
occupation is required, adherence itself does not effect a valid annexation
of territory.'" 4 Additionally, the occupation is considered provisional,5 5
and as a result, occupation does not change the nationality of the local
citizens, nor does it import a transfer of allegiance from the ousted
sovereign. 
5 6
The modern law of belligerent occupation developed during the late
nineteenth century.15 7 The law was first memorialized in treaty form by
149. Id. at 1576.
150. See AKEHURST, supra note 50, at 270. "Even more important than these
political considerations was the fact that the laws of war were designed mainly to prevent
unnecessary suffering. 'Unnecessary' suffering meant suffering which would produce no
military advantage, or a military advantage which was very small in comparison with the
amount of suffering involved." Id. See also Goodman, supra note 144, at 1575.
Some laws of belligerent occupation were necessary to mitigate the severity of
armed conflicts. The law aims to protect civilian populations and thereby to
alleviate the sufferings caused by war. Culminating with the 1899 and 1907
Hague Conventions, the standard belief was that international armed conflicts
arose between states, not people. States were required, therefore, to take care
not to disrupt the existing structure of life in the occupied territory.
Id.
151. AKEHURST, supra note 50, at 270. For instance, an army besieging a town was
entitled to hasten the fall of the town by preventing food from entering the town and by
preventing civilians from leaving; in other words, the army compelled the town to
surrender by starving the civilian inhabitants. Id.
152. Goodman, supra note 144, at 1578.




157. Relevant pre-Hague doctrines include The Lieber Code of 1863 and the 1874
Declaration of Brussels.
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the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907."8 These documents enumerate
the duty owed by a belligerent occupant to citizens of the overrun nation
as follows:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into
the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures
in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public
order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented,
the law in force in the country.' 59
Though rather broad by current standards, the duty owed reflects the
manner in which eighteenth and nineteenth century wars were fought.'
Prior to ratification of the Hague Conventions, wars were rarely fought
along ideological lines. As a rule, military objectives were usually limited
to the extent that a balance of power could be achieved.' Consequently,
war only had a limited effect on the private citizen. 2 The "art" of
eighteenth and nineteenth century war considered the destruction of an
opponent's military capabilities as the primary objective. 63 Collateral
measures such as attacks on civilians, prisoners of war, or destruction of
civilian centers, were considered ineffectual."' The fact that nations also
had not yet adopted the policy of unconditional surrender, also tended to
decrease the extent of destruction.
61
Eighteenth and nineteenth century governments interfered little in the
lives of their subjects, 66 and a change in sovereignty generally had little
effect on the lives of the inhabitants who, as result, tended to be
philosophical about the prospect of defeat in war. 67 Thus, the belligerent
usually managed to peacefully coexist with the local citizenry, as there was
little reason to fear a fifth column comprised of disaffected patriots. 1
68
The law of belligerent occupation changed significantly during the
158. Goodman, supra note 144, at 1575.
159. Id. at 1578.
160. AKEHURST, supra note 50, at 270.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 272.
163. Id. at 270.
164. Id. at 271.
165. Id. at 272.
166. Id. at 270.
167. Id.
168. See generally id. at 269-74.
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Allied occupation of Germany following World War 11.169 The occupation
was consistent with the laws of belligerent occupation in so far as it was
a provisional, rather than permanent, annexation of territory. 0 However,
World War II was clearly fought for ideological reasons, which led the
Allies to adopt a policy of unconditional surrender. 1  Consistent with that
policy, the Allies targeted civilian areas for destruction, sites that were
traditionally considered off-limits. 72 Unlike prior wars, the military value
of civilian targets had increased significantly, as had the Allies' ability to
destroy those targets."7
During the post-war occupation of Germany, Allied forces suspended
many local laws, courts, government organs, and methods of education. 4
These acts were inconsistent with the Hague Conventions, which prohibit
such wholesale changes unless required by military necessity. 75
Regardless, the Allies justified their actions by claiming that the laws,
government organs, and methods of education established by the Nazis
were, in and of themselves, violations of international law.1 76 As a result,
the changes were put forth as exceptions to the Hague Conventions. 77
The Hague Conventions are still technically in force. As a practical
matter though, they have given way to post-World War II agreements
including the Geneva Conventions, the Genocide Convention and the
Vienna Convention.17 1 Consequently, if Iraq were brought before a
tribunal to answer charges alleging a breach of the laws of belligerent
occupation, the indictment and hearing would probably address alleged
war crimes under one or more of those agreements. Charges
contemplating a breach of the laws of war would most likely measure acts
allegedly committed by the Iraqis, against standards enumerated in the
Nuremberg Charter. Abuse of diplomatic personnel would likely be
169. Goodman, supra note 144, at 1578.
170. Id. at 1580. "[A]n occupying power must not treat the country as part of his
own territory, or consider the inhabitants as his lawful subjects. Therefore, annexation
of occupied territory by a belligerent occupant is illegal and should not be recognized."
Id. at 1580-81.
171. AKEHURST, supra note 50, at 272.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Goodman, supra note 144, at 1578.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1579.
177. Id.
178. AKEHURST, supra note 50, at 272.
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considered within the context of the Vienna Convention, which specifically
addresses the rights and treatment of diplomatic personnel.
1. The Nuremberg Charter
Articles 6(b) and 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, "War Crimes" and
"Crimes Against Humanity," respectively, pertain to the abuse of
civilians, foreigners, and prisoners of war, as well as destruction and
confiscation of private property. 7 9 Article 6(b) is the more standard
charge, contemplating that:
Murder, ill treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any
other purpose of the civilian population of or in occupied
territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or . . .
killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not
justified by military necessity." 0
Article 6(c) contemplates crimes that are genocidal in nature, offering
the following definition:
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before
or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds in execution or in connection within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of domestic law of the
country where perpetrated.'
Article 6(b) addresses actions that manifest a general disregard for the
laws of war. Article 6(c) contemplates actions that indicate a genocidal
intent on the part of the invader.
The treatment of Kuwaitis during the Iraqi occupation is replete with
acts prohibited under articles 6(b) and (c).' 82 Amnesty International
179. NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 69, art. 6, b, c.
180. NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 69, art. 6, b.
181. NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 69, art. 6, c.
182. Kuwait Pays the Price, supra note 21. Refugees from that nation, Kuwaiti and
foreign alike, have brought with them appalling accounts of rape, torture, public
execution, widespread and systematic looting and the destruction of homes from which
minor acts of defiance to the occupying power had supposedly stemmed. Id. Amnesty
International produced a report on the situation in Kuwait that is at least as horrifying as
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confirmed widespread arrests, torture under interrogation, and summary
executions." Iraqi forces are also said to have taken as many as 40,000
Kuwaiti prisoners into Iraq while fleeing the invasion by Coalition
forces.1  This mass-kidnapping violates article 6(b), which forbids the
"deportation of civilian population of or in the occupied territory." 1
8 5
Article 6(b) also prohibits "plunder of public or private property, and
wanton destruction of cities, towns and villages. "186 Thus, a tribunal
could consider the looting of Kuwait as a potential article 6(b) violation.187
A tribunal could also contemplate charges under article 6(c) for acts that
do not constitute war crimes, but were committed in connection with the
initial invasion.
Article 6(b) also addresses the treatment of prisoners of war.188 In the
context of the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, a war crimes
tribunal would probably consider the Iraqi television broadcast of captured
Coalition pilots, an article 6(b) violation.' 89 As a factual matter, a
prosecution would have to demonstrate that the statements denouncing the
Coalition involvement in the war were elicited through some form of ill-
treatment."' If demonstrated, Iraqi officials involved in the broadcast
would have engaged in "ill treatment of prisoners of war."'91 As a result,
anything previously recorded. Id. The mere possession of Kuwaiti flags or pictures of
the Emir became a capital offense. Id. Offending youngsters have been shot and their
bodies dumped outside their homes. Id. Fingers and toenails have been pulled out with
pliers and electrodes applied to the genitals of those seized. Id. Amnesty International
has interviewed scores of witnesses to these atrocities. Id. Their testimony builds up a
horrifying picture of widespread arrests, torture under interrogation and summary
executions and mass extra-judicial killings. Id. The Iraqi government has also announced
that they will execute any Iraqi or Kuwaiti discovered hiding foreigners. Id.
183. Id.
184. R.W. Apple, Jr., War in the Gulf. Allies Destroy Iraqis' Main Force; Kuwait
Is Retaken After 7 Months, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1991, at Al.
185. NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 69, art. 6, b.
186. Id.
187. See generally Peter Grier, Iraqi Looting Threatens to Strip Kuwait of Identity,
CHRISTIAN Sci. MoNITOR, Oct. 19, 1990, at 1 ("Senior U.S. official states that there is
no question but that there has been an extraordinary amount of looting. A great amount
of which is mobile, or even transportable, is being taken out of the country.")
188. NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 69, art. 6, b.
189. Elaine Sciolino, War in the Gulf." P.O.W. 's; Iraqi Use of Airmen: Old Tactics,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1991, at A10.
190. NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 69, art. 6, b.
191. Id.
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those involved would be guilty of an article 6(b) violation."
Iraqi officials would have difficulty defending against charges of
violating 6(b) or (c). They are precluded from advancing a nullum crimen
sine lege argument, as the Nuremberg Charter was ratified by the United
Nations before the conflict.'93 Iraqis could attempt to dispute the veracity
of the claims, or alternatively, they could claim military necessity as a
defense."94 The chance of success on either theory is slim, as military
necessity will never excuse incidents of torture, summary executions,
abuse of prisoners of war, or wanton pillage and destruction.'95
Regarding individual responsibility, the Nuremberg Charter explicitly
states that actions taken in an official capacity as a governmental
functionary will not relieve defendants of individual responsibility. 96 As
a result, those who violated articles 6(b) or (c) would be unable to
disclaim responsibility by advancing an "acting in official capacity"
defense. 197
2. The Geneva Conventions and Protocols
The Geneva Conventions, to which Iraq is a signatory, were drafted
in 1864 and 1906.198 They were later amended in 1949, 1961, and again
in 1977.199 The Geneva Conventions were founded on the idea of respect
for the individual and his dignity, and offered protection to those persons
not taking part in hostilities due to sickness, injury, or incapacity.2 The
conventions and protocols are applicable at the outbreak of armed conflict,
as laws of war, and as laws of belligerent occupation. 20'
In addition to defining the manner in which prisoners and civilians
192. Id.
193. Steven Fogelson, Note, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S.
CAL. L. REv. 833, 871 (1990).
194. NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 69, art. 6, b.
195. Id.
196. Id. art. 7.
197. Id.
198. Geneva Conventions, (1) 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; (II) 6 U.S.T. 3217,
75 U.N.T.S. 85; (IM 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; (IV) 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
199. AKEHURST, supra note 50, at 271.
200. Geneva Conventions, supra note 198, (1) art. 46, (11) art. 47, (=) art. 13, (V)
art. 33.
201. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 198, art. 2.
[Vol. 14
IRAQI CONFLICT
shall be treated in war or during a belligerent occupation, the Geneva
Conventions prohibit under all circumstances: murder, torture, corporal
punishment, mutilation, outrages upon personal dignity, the taking of
hostages, collective punishments, execution without regular trial and all
cruel and degrading treatment.2 °2
The Iraqi army stands accused of engaging in all of the above
activities.20 3 There were reports of arbitrary arrests, torture, general ill-
treatment and extra-judicial killings.2 °4 If substantiated, these acts
certainly breach those sections of the Geneva Convention that addresss
treatment of civilians.20 5
A central tenet of the conventions is the protection of "children from
any form of indecent assault. " 206 During the invasion and its aftermath,
the Iraqis allegedly engaged in acts that, if proven, display a total
disregard for this aspect of the convention.20 7 For example, Amnesty
International reports that Kuwaiti boys were summarily shot and their
bodies dumped outside their homes in instances where Iraqis suspected that
they opposed the invasion.20 8
The Geneva Conventions also protect foreign civilians who remain
within the territory or sovereignty that is attacked, occupied or both.2 °9 Yet
foreign civilians who remained in Kuwait and Iraq after the Iraqi invasion
suffered substantial mistreatment. 2 0 For example, American, British and
French citizens in Iraq and Kuwait were seized and detained by the Iraqi
military and held in and around Baghdad.2 1 Though most, if not all, were
eventually allowed to leave, they were treated for a time as hostages. 1 2
202. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 198, art. 3.
203. Kuwait Pays the Price, supra note 21, at 26.
204. Id.
205. Protocol Addition to the Geneva Convention of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), arts. 51, 52, 16
I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I].
206. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 198, art. 24; Protocol I, supra note 205,
arts. 51, 52.
207. Kuwait Pays the Price, supra note 21, at 26.
208. Id.
209. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 198, art. 4.
210. Treatment of foreigners in Kuwait and Iraq was reportedly dependant on the
response to the invasion by that nation of which the foreigner claims citizenship. Riding,
supra note 22, at 1. Reports confirm that foreigners whose sovereign nation had
condemned the invasion were being treated less well than those whose sovereign nation
had taken a soft or supportive stance. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. These hostages were only allowed out two hours a day and lived in
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Many were placed in close proximity to potential military and industrial
targets in an effort to shield those areas from an air assault.2"3 This
strategy of course presupposes that the hostage's presence will deter a
military strike at that site.
2 14
Regardless of the strategic effectiveness, the taking of hostages is
strictly prohibited under any circumstance. 2 " Geneva Convention IV
permits an invader to detain foreigners who present security risks, but also
mandates a special hearing before an impartial body where the detention
may be appealed.
2 16
These protections reflect the long-standing practice of granting
protective status to foreign civilians caught within the borders of warring
217nations.  Generally, foreign civilians are allowed to stay at their own
risk or are given safe passage to a border."1 This treatment is routinely
given even to those individuals who are citizens of an enemy nation. 9
Though seemingly counterproductive from a military perspective,
moral and practical considerations dictate this practice. From an ethical
standpoint, nations bound by the conventions recognize that the national
policy of an enemy nation has little or nothing to do with the unfortunate
individual caught within its borders during wartime. Hence, vindictive
bungalows near the refinery under close guard. Id. The soldiers stayed outside the camp,
but there was no possibility of escape; they held a roll-call every night. Id.
213. Id. Secretary of State James A. Baker III stated:
At strategic installations in Iraq, more than one hundred American citizens are being
held hostage as human shields . . . . These Americans are forced to sleep on
vermin-ridden concrete floors. They are kept in the dark during the day and moved
only at night. They have had their meals cut to two a day. And many are becoming
sick as they endure a terrible ordeal. The very idea of Americans being used as
human shields is simply unconscionable.
Id.
214. "Under the Geneva Convention IV . . . , foreign civilians... are 'protected
persons' and may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military
operations." Roberts, Saddam Leaps, supra note 17, at 25. See also Protocol I, supra
note 205, art. 51.
215. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 198, art. 3. "Civilians in enemy territory,
unless security reasons forbid it, civilians in enemy territory must be allowed to leave."
Id. art. 35. If they do not leave or are retained, they shall be treated in the same way as
aliens in general. Id. art. 38.
216. Id.
217. See generally Geneva Convention IV, supra note 198, arts. 27-49.
218. See generally id.
219. See generally id.
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action against individuals for decisions made by their sovereigns is
considered inappropriate.
The practical import of the Geneva Conventions' protection of
foreigners reflects reciprocity based upon fear of reprisal. To illustrate,
while persons caught within the borders of nation "A" are at the mercy of
that nation, nation A's own citizens may be similarly situated within nation
"B." As a result, nation A will resist accosting citizens of nation B for
fear of reprisal.
Reciprocity-based systems are ineffective, however, when only one
party to a conflict fears reprisal. Under this scenario, the risk to foreign
civilians can increase dramatically. This apparently was the case in Iraq
and Kuwait," 0 where reports indicate that Iraqi treatment of foreigners was
inconsistent at best, vindictive at worst, and probably in violation of
Geneva Convention Article IV."
Finally, the Geneva Conventions forbid the "pillage and unnecessary
destruction of property. ""2 Again reflecting the notion that war is a
dispute between nations and not individuals, the convention mandates that
property be left intact, and prohibits confiscation of personal property.' m
Such considerations appear not to have been adhered to by the Iraqi
military.' Reports from Kuwait reveal mass and wanton destruction;'m
Iraqi soldiers have looted with impunity in what appeared to be a
calculated attempt to destroy that nation.226
Prior to the Coalition attack, the Iraqi army rigged oil wells and oil
refineries with incendiary explosives. 227 When Coalition forces commenced
220. Riding, supra note 22, at 1.
221. Id.
222. Protocol Addition to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), arts. 4, 13,
16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977).
223. "Private property in occupied territory must not be taken, or interfered with,
unless it is of use for local military purposes. Mere plunder was prohibited." STARKE,
supra note 72, at 547.
224. Weller, supra note 48. The charges being considered by the United States
include pillaging, plundering and the general failure of the Iraqi authorities to control their
troops in occupied Kuwait. Id. See also Grier, supra note 11, at 1. According to Kuwati
exiles and United States officials, Iraqi dismantlement of Kuwait had two aims: enrichment
of Baghdad, and destruction of the Kuwaiti identity. Id. There is no question that there
has been an extraordinary amount of looting; a great deal of what was mobile, or even
transportable, was taken out of the country. Id.
225. Grier, supra note 11, at 1.
226. Id.
227. Thomas C. Hayes, The Job of Fighting Kuwait's Infernos, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
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the ground attack, the Iraqis detonated the explosives, causing widespread
oilwell fires.22 These fires, which are extremely difficult to extinguish,
caused a black shroud to hang over Kuwait and surrounding areas.229
Though some military advantage could arguably have been derived from
this act, the conventions' ban on the unnecessary destruction of property
was clearly breached."
The Iraqi military has also been accused of destroying buildings in
Kuwait City in an apparent attempt to obliterate evidence of atrocities
committed against Kuwaiti citizens."' If substantiated, these acts are
likely to be considered additional violations of the ban against unnecessary
destruction of property.232
Finally, Iraqi forces purportedly leaked tremendous quantities of crude
oil into the Persian Gulf.233 The oil spill was the largest in history, forty
times larger than the Exxon Valdez spill in Prince William Sound. 4 This
act is directly cognizable under the Geneva Convention IV, Article 55,
which includes a prohibition against "methods or means of warfare which
are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural
environment and thereby prejudice the health or survival of the
population. "23"
If the actions discussed above are adjudicated before a tribunal, Iraqi
officials would have difficulty forming an effective defense. Iraqis could
advance military necessity as a defense against allegations of wanton
destruction of property.236 However, acts committed by the Iraqis that are
prohibited under all circumstances are not amenable to claims of military
necessity and, therefore, may not be excused."
28, 1991, at Al.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Geneva Convention IV supra note 198, arts. 33, 53.
231. Caryle Murphy, U.S. Says Iraq Is Stepping Up Campaign of Execution and
Torture in Kuwait; Reports Suggest That Troops Are Trying to "Destroy Evidence" of
Actions, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1991, at Al.
232. Geneva Convention IV supra note 198, arts. 33, 53.
233. Eric Schmitt, War in the Gulf: The Fouled Sea; the Gulf Oil Cleanup Flounders
in Bureaucracy, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 1991, at A12.
234. Id.
235. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 198, art. 55.
236. See Kuwait Pays the Price, supra note 21, at 26.
237. CHEN, supra note 141, at 241.
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3. The Genocide Conventions
The Genocide Conventions were adopted in 1948 by the United
Nations General Assembly to improve international prohibitions against the
intentional destruction of racial, ethnic, national, and religious groups.2"
The conventions contemplate actual genocide, as well as conspiracy,
incitement, attempt and complicity to commit genocide. 23 9 Consequently,
acts committed by the Iraqis that manifest an intent to commit genocide
against the Kuwaitis could be adjudicated under the Genocide
Conventions.' °
A prosecution under article II of the conventions would involve
evidence of acts that indicated a genocidal intent on the part of the Iraqis.
Acts that demonstrate genocidal intent include killing members of the
group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,
and deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about physical destruction in whole or in part.2 "
Acts calculated to cause death, serious physical or mental harm are
shown simply by offering evidence of the events themselves; that is these
events generally speak for themselves. "Destructive Conditions" are
evidenced as a cumulative effect of the massive physical destruction,
organized looting, generally poor treatment of the Kuwaiti population, and
the large-scale movement of Iraqi and Palestinian families into Kuwait.
All are evidence of "actions which inflict upon the group, conditions
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part." 2
Charges brought under the Genocide Convention are likely to portray
the Iraqis as conspiring, inciting, or attempting to cause genocide, as
defined in article 11.243 In the alternative, a tribunal could consider





242. Grier, supra note 11, at 2. To support charges under (a), (b), or (c), the
prosecution could seek to substantiate claims that Kuwaitis found with pictures of the Al-
Sabah family are summarily executed; Kuwait City's name has been changed to Kadhima,
an ancient term for the region, and statues and portraits of Saddam Hussein have been
erected. Id. Iraqi families were imported to occupy vacant housing and computer records
of Kuwaiti families were destroyed, all in an attempt to destroy the Kuwaiti identity. Id.
243. The 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide
Convention].
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intent" on the part of the Iraqis as evidenced by their mass killing of
Kuwaitis. 2"
If a tribunal is established to adjudicate accusations of genocide, the
prosecution could also attempt to adjudicate the 1988 and 1989 gassing of
the Kurdish minority by the Iraqi military. 5 As a factual matter, this act
probably meets the statutory requirements of article II(a), as it involved
the intentional mass murder of a "distinct ethnic minority."' From a
practical standpoint though, it is unlikely that prosecution for this act
would be adjudicated by a tribunal hearing allegations of war crimes
arising out of the Iraqi conflict. Any attempts to do so would probably
illicit accusations of "victor's justice," which could undermine the validity
of the tribunal. Possibly though, the incident would arise within the
context of a prosecution as the evidentiary equivalent of prior bad acts.
The Genocide Convention offers no defense for participation in
genocidal activity.24 The military necessity defense is not available, and
the official capacity defense is implicitly precluded.248 Therefore, accused
Iraqis would most likely attempt to dispute the prosecution's version of the
facts. However, unless the veracity of the alleged acts previously
mentioned are seriously undermined, Iraqi officials would likely be found
to have violated the Genocide Convention.
4. The Vienna Convention and the Treatment of Diplomatic Personnel
It is generally accepted that where international relations are
concerned, "rules of diplomatic immunity are essential for the maintenance
of relations between states."" These rules are "accepted throughout the
world by nations of all creeds, cultures and political complexions."250
Historically, diplomatic personnel have been granted special status within
the host nation;"1 this heightened status generally involves a grant of
244. Id.
245. Juan P. Fonseca, Middle East: Thousands of Kurds Said to Be Fighting Iraq,
Inter Press Service, Feb. 6, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRES File.
246. Genocide Convention, supra note 243, art. 2.
247. Id.
248. Id. art. 5.
249. Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 24 (May 24).
250. Id.
251. AKEHURST, supra note 50, at 115.
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diplomatic immunity.252 As a result, diplomatic personnel are shielded
from criminal and civil liability within the host state;253 when diplomatic
relations between the two nations are broken, diplomatic personnel may
generally request safe passage to a border.' -
The modem law of diplomatic relations is contained primarily in the
Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations,255 which establish diplomatic
missions and consulates, 6 enumerate protections for diplomats, 257 and
illustrate the purposes of the conventions.258
Many nations report that during the invasion and aftermath, their
representatives within Iraq and Kuwait suffered treatment that did not
comport with the Vienna Conventions.259 Iraqi treatment of diplomats
seemed to reflect the policy stance taken by the diplomats' nations, with
respect to the Iraqi invasion.26 In general, diplomats from nations taking
a hard line against the invasion were treated less favorably than diplomats
from nations taking a soft or more supportive stance.26' Consequently,
American and British diplomats suffered more than their contemporaries
at other embassies.262
Actions by the Iraqis that specifically violated the Vienna Conventions
were condemned by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution
664.63 The abuses specified include the Iraqi order to close diplomatic
252. Id. at 114.
253. For example, the Vienna Convention grants immunity from Criminal Jurisdiction
of the receiving state, as well as limited immunity from civil and administrative
jurisdiction. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 23, 1969, art.
31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
254. Id. art. 43.
255. AKEHURST, supra note 50, at 114.
256. Vienna Convention, supra note 253, art. 2.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. The World v. Saddam Hussein, supra note 3, at 22. Saddam Hussein lashed out
against diplomacy itself. His troops lawlessly threatened foreign embassies in Kuwait as
his regime detained United States diplomats and dependents who were promised a safe exit
from Baghdad. Id.
260. Zabarenko, supra note 53; United States allegations against Iraq include
kidnapping diplomats and violating embassies. The Iraqi order closing certain diplomatic
missions compounds the litany of illegalities; it is part of the purported annexation of
Kuwait, itself illegal and is in clear violation of the Vienna Convention on diplomatic
relations. Roberts, Saddam Leaps, supra note 17, at 25.
261. Riding, supra note 22, at Al.
262. Id.
263. S.C. Res. 664, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2937th mtg., at 20-21, U.N. Doe.
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and consular missions in Kuwait; withdrawal of immunity from these
missions and their personnel; 26 and acts of violence committed by Iraqis
against diplomatic missions and their personnel in Kuwait, including the
abduction of personnel enjoying diplomatic immunity, as well as foreign
nationals who were present on those premises.265 These acts violated
article 22(1) of the Vienna Convention, which holds "the premises of the
mission inviolable," as well as article 22(2), which places upon the host
state a "duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the
mission against intrusion or damage, and to prevent any disturbance of the
peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity." 2'
If prosecuted for violation of the Vienna Convention, Iraqi officials
may attempt to justify their treatment of diplomatic personnel, missions,
and consulates by claiming that the Kuwaiti missions were redundant in
light of the Iraqi's "valid" assertion of title over Kuwait. This argument
would probably fail as the invasion of Kuwait will most likely not be ruled
a valid annexation of territory.
V. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
International law recognizes five types of criminal jurisdiction:
territorial, nationality of the offender, protective, passive personalty, and
universality.267 Of the five, universality is the most powerful as it grants
nations the power to prosecute persons who commit crime outside the
nation's borders.268 Under this theory, jurisdiction is granted even in
situations where the person accused had no special connection with the
forum state.269 In addition, universality allows nations to apply their own
law to criminal proceedings that are subject to universal jurisdiction.27
Not all international crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction;
however, acts that manifest genocide or a recognized war crime generally
are.27 The rationale behind universality jurisdiction is that war crimes are




266. Vienna Convention, supra note 253, art. 22, 2.
267. Goodman, supra note 144, at 1519.
268. Id.





of all people.2" This reflects the eighteenth century doctrine of hostis
humani generis-"certain acts would make the perpetrator liable to capture
and trial wherever he went." 21 Consequently, all states and individuals
would have standing to initiate prosecution for the alleged commission of
war crimes.
VI. FORUM CHOICES
As the universality principle of jurisdiction would most likely be
involved, any judicial body is competent to adjudicate Iraqi officials for
alleged war crimes.274 Likely fora would include municipal courts-in
Kuwait, United States, United Kingdom, etc.-and international
courts-the International Court of Justice or an ad hoc criminal tribunal.
An international tribunal modeled after the Nuremberg Tribunal would
probably be formed to try alleged war crimes for which responsibility had
attached to specific individuals. This forum would probably be the vehicle
whereby major players in the Iraqi government and armed forces could be
tried. The tribunal would probably be comprised of judges from Muslim
and Western nations, to avoid the appearance of a trial of the Third World
by the First." Subsequent trials of more minor characters could possibly
be handled by municipal courts, or by military courts operating under the
auspices of the United Nations or occupying forces.
Litigation between states concerning issues of reparation and the like,
would probably be dealt with by the International Court of Justice
("ICJ").276 The ICJ was established by the Charter of the United Nations
as its principal judicial organ277 and has competence to try disputes
between states in accordance with international law.27' Applicable
international law doctrines include international conventions, international
custom and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, as
well as judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations.279
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Randall, supra note 51, at 788.
275. Campbell, supra note 2.
276. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 36, 1, 59 Stat.
1095, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter STATUTE OF THE I.C.J.].
277. U.N. CHARTER art. 7, 1.
278. Id. arts. 7, 38.
279. STATUTE OF THE I.C.J., supra note 276, art. 38(a)-(d).
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This Note has considered the invasion and subsequent acts under
international conventions rather than the other options available under the
Statute of the ICJ, because international conventions are more readily
available and offer greater precision. Moreover, Iraq is a signatory to
these conventions and has therefore has manifested a willingness to be
bound by those bodies of law. 80
Article 36 of the Statute of the ICJ states that "[t]he jurisdiction of the
Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters
specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties
and conventions in force." 21 Accordingly, the ICJ would be competent
to adjudicate actions that breach the Nuremberg Charter, the United
Nations Charter, the Genocide Conventions, or the Geneva Conventions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the turn of the century, there have been many attempts to form
an effective body of international criminal law to eradicate aggressive war
as a method of international decision making and to secure humane
treatment for persons during both war and peacetime.8 2 Some of the more
notable attempts include the international agreements discussed in this
Note-the Hague Conventions, the Treaty of Versailles, the Charter of the
League of Nations, the Nuremberg Charter, the Charter of United Nations
and the Genocide Convention. Unfortunately, these agreements have had
only marginal success as international criminal law doctrines. 2 3
The rather ineffectual quality of international criminal law seems to
stem from the hierarchical differences in international law and criminal
law. The two systems differ in their goals, approaches, methods, and
outcomes, which creates a lack of cohesion and sense of direction in
international criminal law. 2 Criminal law reflects a vertical power
structure; the enforcing body is superior to the offender, and may rely on
280. Tyler, supra note 7.
281. STATUTE OF THE I.C.J., supra note 276, art. 36, 1.
282. "JO ]n e of the most significant twentieth century developments has been the legal
regulation of the former unregulated privilege of states to resort to war, or to engage in
non-war hostilities, or to use force, and the development of the concept of collective
security." STARKE, supra note 72, at 534.
283. M. CHERiF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A DRAFr
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE 23 (1980). "International criminal law which is thought
of as combining the best features of international law and criminal law has only managed
so far to combine its worst." Id.
284. Id. at 19.
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coercion to enforce the mandates of the system.285 On the other hand,
international law reflects a horizontal power structure; nations are coequal
and submission to sanctions is voluntary.286 Such doctrinal divergences
give international criminal law a split personality which has plagued its
development.287
Modern international criminal law relies on the voluntary agreement
of states to bind themselves to the terms of treaties and conventions that
define international crimes. If the state refuses, there is no supra-
national structure to enforce the terms of the treaties and conventions.
Instead, there is only an indirect control scheme to enforce the mandates
of the system. 2 9  As a result, enforcement is uneven and subject to
political considerations that result in erratic adherence to the law. 290
The primary stumbling block to the creation and enforcement of
international law doctrines is the parochialism and self-interest inherent in
sovereignties. Yet many sovereignties now demand stronger, more
affirmative leadership from international organizations like the United
Nations, indicating a decline in parochialism, which may be the result of
the following factors.291
First, the massive growth in technology involving communications,
travel, and trade has caused our economic, social, and cultural interests to
become entwined and interdependent with other nations. Thus, through
increased extraterritorial interaction our parochial concerns have lessened.
Second, the thaw in East-West relations, and the concomitant mass
movement towards self-determination has lessened the impact of East-West
relations on international decision making. 29  The abrupt end to the cold
war removed that method of international decision making, leaving a void.
285. "Criminal law in all municipal systems is predicated on vertical authoritative
decision making processes which rely on coercive means to enforce the mandates of the
system." Id.
286. "International law is a legal system built on the assumption of consensus and
voluntary compliance by its principle subjects (states) whose relationship is one of co-
equals; no superior authority enforces the mandates of the system." Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 23.
289. Id.
290. "International law is violated all the time without prompting the extraordinary
step of an international war crimes trial." Campbell, supra note 2.
291. Joint Soviet-American Statement for Peace and Security, supra note 3. The
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The existing international, political, and economic climate seems to
present the world community with a rare chance to effect positive change
in the area of international decision making. Positive steps would entail
adoption of an international criminal code and creation of a permanent
international criminal tribunal. Both have repeatedly been proposed to the
United Nations, for example, during the Eighth United Nations Congress
on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held on
August 1990.2
The proposed international criminal tribunal is based on the draft
statute for the creation of an International Criminal Jurisdiction to
Implement the International Convention on the Crime of Apartheid, which
was prepared by Professor M. Cheriff Bassiouni at the request of the
United Nations. The need for an international criminal tribunal is
enumerated in section III of the draft statute, which cites the increase in
international and transnational crime, terrorism, and the inability of states
and national legal systems to act unilaterally to control and suppress
danger arising from international and transnational criminality as factors
which indicate a need for the tribunal.
Codification of international criminal law would eliminate the
problems generated by the absence of clearly defined offenses, elements
and sanctions;2" and an international criminal tribunal would inject a
measure of legitimacy into international criminal adjudication.29
The consequence of both would be the beginning of greater stability
and legitimacy in international law and decision making. It would help
create a solid footing upon which international relationships between
sovereignties could grow into the twenty-first century. Failure to
capitalize on this fleeting opportunity will result only in the continuation
of the status quo in international decision making. Unfortunately, in an
age of swiftly shifting alliances and massive destructive capabilities, the
status quo offers cold comfort to those sovereignties and individuals whose
rights and interests remain at risk.
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